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Abstract
The European Union is a grand project in supranational governance.  As the Union 
continues to enlarge, however, it faces new challenges and new questions.  In this thesis, 
I use Slovakia as a case study to examine the impact of EU integration and the 
relationship between the EU’s political goals and the political culture of states 
themselves. I will argue that there is often a complex and contradictory relationship 
between these two conceptions, and that this has long-term implications for the processes 
of continued European integration, supranational governance, and Europeanization which 
are central to the future of the European Union. 
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1Chapter 1
Introduction 
The European Union is the greatest project in supranationality the world has ever 
known.  Begun narrowly as an economic union, and originally based on the unification of 
policy regarding only two products, it has developed into a major political, cultural, and 
economic union.  From 6 members, it has grown this year to 27, including 10 which 
previously lay behind the iron curtain in the Soviet sphere of interest.  When French 
foreign minister Robert Schuman announced the creation of the European Coal and 
Steele Community in 19501, he could not have envisioned the Union which would 
eventually develop.  This Union is something much more than Schuman imagined.  It is a 
different union with different goals, different agendas, and a diversity which would have 
seemed unimaginable at its inception. 
 These changes have been controversial, and they have not come easily either for 
the European Union or for the new member states.  Greater influence has meant greater 
complexity and larger bureaucracy.  As states struggle to adapt to the complex rules and 
regulations of the Union, the Union struggles to adapt to the new complexities that come 
with diversity.  The EU faces new questions with each new member.  How should 
economic policy be conceptualized in a union whose members’ economies run the gamut 
from weak and developing, to some of the strongest in the world?  Are existing policies, 
formulated in the context of Western Europe, useful in a political climate still reeling 
from the effects of communist oppression?    How far should expansion extend, and 
 
1 Schuman, Robert. "The Schuman Declaration of May 9th, 1950." Europa. 12 Apr 2007 
<http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm>. 
2where are the lines of Europe?  The answers to these questions, and the impact of 
European integration will likely not be clear for some time. 
 In this paper, I will look at Slovakia, one of the newer members of the European 
Union, to examine the impact of EU integration and the relationship between the EU’s 
political goals and the political climate of states themselves.  In particular, given the 
European Union’s concept of the political future of Europe, I will ask how well Slovakia 
conforms to this core political vision. 
Slovakia’s case is especially interesting for several reasons.  As a new member 
state, it provides a lens through which to view the process of accession and the early 
impacts of membership on new member states.  The Slovak case is also particularly 
interesting because Slovakia’s accession to the EU, for a time, was far from certain.  
Finally, political developments in Slovakia since accession have brought to power a 
government made up of three parties whose commitment to integration is dubious, and 
their actions since election have further called into question their political orientation. 
These events provide a particularly salient example of the complex relationship between 
EU and domestic politics in member states. 
 I will begin my thesis by outlining a brief history of Slovakia since the 18th 
century.  Paying particular attention to the development of national consciousness 
throughout this period and the interactions of nationalism with the outside forces which 
controlled the Slovak lands, I will explore the development of Slovak political culture 
through history.  Slovakia’s present political climate and its relationship to the European 
Union as an outside force which influences Slovak policy are integrally linked to its 
3historical relationship to control by outside forces and the development of Slovak 
national identity in opposition to this. 
 Thus grounded in the history of Slovakia, I proceed to an examination of the EU’s 
development from an economic union designed to prevent war, into a supranational 
organization dedicated to the unification and security of the European continent.  
Beginning with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, I will explore 
the way that the EU’s goals and powers have shifted over time.  Through this exploration, 
I will develop a paradigm for understanding the goals of the European union and outline 
the core political vision which underlies these goals. 
 Once I have established a definition of the European Union’s political vision, I 
begin to examine where Slovakia, as a new member state, fits into this political vision.   
This discussion must start with a look at the accession process as the EU’s instrument of 
evaluation for prospective member states.  Looking at Slovakia’s movement through this 
process will provide a basis for understanding Slovak integration into the EU.  The 
weaknesses of accession will be discussed, as well as the political values embodied by it.  
Slovakia’s accession process will be the foundation upon which further examination of 
the relationship between Slovak and EU political climates will be grounded. 
 Next I will seek to explore Slovakia’s own political culture.  Here I will define 
political culture as the values, beliefs, and behaviors of the citizens of a state.  In 
analyzing Slovakia’s fit with the EU’s political vision, I will look at three key indicators 
of political culture. First, I will look at voter behavior, particularly the outcome of the 
referendum on EU membership and the most recent, 2006, elections.  I will use voter 
behavior as a way to examine Slovak political choice, and the way that the electorate 
4responds to party and organizational behavior.  Secondly, I will analyze the behavior of 
political parties and their programs.  In this examination, I will look at the way that the 
current government parties interact with and respond to the European Union and its 
regulations.  Finally, I will examine public opinion data from the last two years pertaining 
to Slovak citizen’s own views on the European Union and their own government. I will 
look at these as an indication of Slovak citizen’s relationship to the EU.  These three 
levels of analysis will allow my argument to be based not only on government behavior, 
but also on the express opinions of citizens themselves. 
 Looking at these examples, I will argue that there are clear contradictions in 
Slovak political culture, especially as relates to the EU.  These contradictions point to a 
complex relationship between Slovakia and the European Union.  In my analysis and 
conclusion I will explore this complex relationship and discuss the implications of such 
interaction on future processes of European integration and Europeanization. 
5Chapter 2
Literature Review 
My thesis will draw on, and contribute to, two separate scholarly literatures: 
literature on theories of nationalism and literature on Europeanization.  For many years, 
these literatures have remained largely distinct, perhaps even exclusive of one another.  
In recent years a few scholars have begun to discuss the intersections between these two 
areas of research, and it is in this area that my work will most concretely contribute.  In 
this section, therefore, I will first seek to describe the current state of each of these 
literatures, and then to discuss the points of intersection and their importance to events in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Theories of Europeanization
In discussing theories of Europeanization, it is important to first make a 
distinction between the concept of Europeanization and that European Integration.  
Although these terms would seem logically to refer to similar processes, they represent 
two different, if intersecting, bodies of scholarship.  As a broad generalization, theories of 
integration focus primarily on the impact of shifting EU boundaries and changing 
systems of governance on the European community as a collective whole.  Theories of 
Europeanization, on the other hand, focus on the impact of many of these same processes 
on domestic political and social systems.  Although there continues to be some 
disagreement as to this specific distinction, the majority of scholarship subscribes to 
some version of this distinction in terms. 
 In this paper, I will be working primarily with theories of Europeanization, 
although it is inevitable that in any such discussion, theories of integration will be 
6relevant.  This intersection speaks to the main focus of my study, which is the 
relationship between EU and domestic conceptions of political community in Slovakia.  
In the long run, however, my primary interest in this study is the domestic situation in 
Slovakia, and only secondarily and relationally the impact that that situation has on the 
broader European community.  Thus, here, I will try to discuss the ways in which 
Europeanization is characterized in current scholarship, before outlining the definition I 
use in this thesis. 
 Tania Borzel argues that “Europeanization is a two-way process.  It entails a 
‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ dimension” 2. In her description, the bottom-up dimension 
of Europeanization encompasses the way that European institutions are developed and 
create a new set of “norms, rules and practices”3, while the top-down dimension focuses 
on the “impact of these new institutions on political structures and processes of the 
Member States”4. This is reflective of the distinction between European integration and 
Europeanization which I made above.  Indeed, some definitions of Europeanization 
border on confusion with issues of European integration.5 Perhaps the most important 
distinction here is that of development versus impact.  The bottom-up dimension of 
Europeanization refers to the creation of structures, and the top-down dimension refers to 
the effect of these structures on domestic actors.  European integration, on the other hand, 
refers to the political process of creating a union of European governments. 
 
2 Borzel, Tania (2002). 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
5 Jim Bullet and Andrew Gamble discuss just this confusion in their piece “Conceptualizing 
Europeanization”.  They talk about the importance of considering theories of “concept formation” in the 
creation of our definitions of newly developed social scientific terms. 
7While I agree with Borzel that these concepts represent two dimensions of one
concept (Europeanization), many studies of Europeanization not only focus on one of 
these aspects, but also define Europeanization in a way which excludes the other.  
Specifically, I am referring to studies which define Europeanization as simply the 
domestic impact of EU integration (see Glenn 2002, Knill & Dirk, and to a somewhat 
lesser degree Gwiazda for examples of this approach)6. Often these sorts of definitions 
are found in work which simply assumes an understanding of the concept of 
Europeanization without putting forth a working definition.  In these cases, it is most 
commonly left to the reader to assume that Europeanization refers simply to the domestic 
aspect of integration theory. 
 One problem with this type of definition is that it neglects to examine any of the 
processes of Europeanization which take place outside of the European Union (both in 
candidate countries and in non-EU states within Europe) and also largely ignores the bi-
directional nature of Europeanization as coming both from states to the collective and 
from the collective to the state (this will be discussed in somewhat more detail later).  In 
the simplicity of this definition, many of the important aspects of Europeanization are 
lost.  Seen only as an extension of theories of integration, the uniqueness and complexity 
of this process at both the political and social levels is not adequately accounted for. 
Some other definitions recognize the double faceted nature of Europeanization 
mentioned by Borzel, but choose, as she suggests, to focus on one facet or the other.  
That is, they choose to approach their study either by focusing primarily on the 
 
6 Glenn, John (2002); Knill, Christoph and Lehmkuhl, Dirk..; Gwiazda, Anna (2002).  
 
8institutions and their development (see Bevers and Trondal)7 or by focusing primarily on 
their domestic impact (see Goetz and Hix, Gwiazda, Glenn, and Knill & Dirk).8 In either 
case, while analysis may be simplified, it is also incomplete.  Studies focusing only on 
institutions tend to minimize the impact of the often significant changes which must be 
made to domestic political systems in order to implement these institutions.  On the other 
hand, studies which focus exclusively on domestic impact of these institutions often 
minimalize the agency of domestic governments in creating and shaping political 
communities and structures.  In either case, important levels of analysis are neglected. 
 The final type of analysis of Europeanization is one which tries to bring together 
both aspects of Europeanization in a working definition.  This characterizes Borzel’s 
approach, and similarly Howell’s (who seems to draw quite heavily on Borzel).  Borzel 
links the top-down and bottom-up facets of Europeanization by focusing “on the ways in 
which Member State governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to 
them”9. The central point of her argument is that governments, in an attempt to minimize 
the costs of implementation of European norms to domestic systems, attempt to “upload 
their domestic policies to the European level” while simultaneously downloading 
European level standards, creating an interactive, relational process of Europeanization.10 
Although Borzel does attempt to provide a more comprehensive, connective 
definition of Europeanization and to analyze the process from a more holistic perspective, 
there are still several major criticisms to be made of her work.  Perhaps the most 
 
7 Beyers, Jan and Trondal, Jarle (2004). 
8 The second of these is the more common approach, although this is a recent development.  This is most 
likely due to an increasing interest in the domestic impact of European institutions and also the increasing 
recognition of (perceived) overlap between the bottom-up aspect of Europeanization and theories of 
European integration. 
9 Borzel, Tania (2002). 
10 ibid. 
9important is that her paper focuses on the Europeanization process almost exclusively 
within member states. Disregarding for the moment the fact that Europeanization is in 
some ways a global and not only a European phenomenon, the boundaries of Europe are 
by no means conclusively agreed upon, nor are they delineated by the boundaries of the 
European Union.  Switzerland, for example, which has opted not to join the European 
Union, would, I believe, be considered almost unarguably to be located within the 
boundaries of Europe, and this is not to mention the numerous states which may one day 
join the EU, but have not yet entered formal accession talks.11 With the boundaries of 
Europe so disputed, it seems problematic to speak of Europeanization as a process only 
applicable to EU member states (and perhaps also, by implication, accession states).  
Even if it is EU norms which we will use to delineate “European” standards, rules, 
expectations, etc, there are certainly both indirect and direct pressures on non-EU states 
within the European sphere to conform to these standards, and rewards besides EU 
membership (such as improved trade relations, looser border controls, etc) to be gained 
through compliance to a European norm. 
 This however brings up the second, and perhaps more serious, criticism of Borzel, 
and indeed of every theory examined thus far, and that is the exclusive focus on political 
systems to the exclusion of cultural impacts or impacts on political community of 
processes of Europeanization.  As Europeanization theory has focused almost exclusively 
on the Europeanization of institutions, it has paid little or no attention to the integration of 
these institutions into society, or their acceptance by citizens of member states.   
 
11 I am thinking here principally of the Ukraine, Belarus, and some of the former 
Yugoslav Republics, but Turkey may certainly also fall into this category. 
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Radaelli has previously, and I believe correctly, pointed out that Europeanization, 
though commonly mistaken with such terms, is not synonymous (nor does it necessarily 
imply as a consequence) convergence of ideas or policies, harmonization (that is bringing 
policies into complete harmony with one another), or political integration12. I do believe, 
however, that Europeanization can be conceptualized as a process of gradual gravitation 
towards a core set of concepts, and a core “European” political and social identity.  While 
states are each moving in different ways, at different paces, and from different directions, 
they are all moving, or perceive themselves to be moving, towards the same central 
object.  Here it is important to note that this is evidenced not only by shifts in policy or 
institutional structures, but also by overall shifts in social conceptions of identity and 
changes in the functioning of political communities.  Additionally, I believe that the 
object, “Europe”, refers to something significantly more complex than simply a 
convergence of “EU standards” or policy, and instead implies a much more abstract and 
intangible idea”.  Indeed I perceive one of the greatest challenges in the European Union 
today to be grounded in precisely the intangibility of Europe as an object.  European 
states all seem to believe they are heading towards the same goal (European unity), but as 
evidenced by the uneven support for the EU constitution and ongoing debates about the 
nature of European governance and the future of expansion, seem to perceive the nature 
and shape of that goal somewhat differently. 
 How, then, can we define Europeanization?  I submit that Europeanization refers 
to the process by which a society gradually changes and gravitates in the direction of 
what it perceives to be the European ideal.  This is a process both of policy shifts, and 
 
12 Radaelli 2002 
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changes at the cultural level, and is driven by EU standards, perceived (though not 
concretely outlined) external pressures, and changes from within based on the perception 
of the Europe towards which society is heading.  It is an interactive process involving 
both top-down and bottom-up changes13, and can be motivated by a variety of agendas.  
The connecting factor in all cases is a sense of movement towards “Europe”.  Although 
definitions of what is represented by, how best to arrive at, and what it will take to reach 
this object may differ, Europeanization represents the perceived movement towards it.  
Additionally, gravitation is a multi-directional process in which all bodies exert force on 
one another in order to create a functioning system of movement.  The same is true of 
Europeanization.  Just as member states gravitate towards “Europe”, Europe is also being 
shifted and steered by the member states, creating a complex system of push and pull that 
shapes understandings of Europe and the European Union. 
 
Theories of Nationalism
The second major body of literature which will inform (and be informed) by this 
thesis is that on the nature of nationalism.  Scholarship on theories of nationalism has 
historically been divided into two general categories, within which there exist many 
facets.  In this paper I will refer to these two theories as the modernist and pre-modernist 
theories, though each has been characterized in a variety of ways. 
Pre-modernist theories of nationalism, sometimes referred to as primordialist, 
essentialist, or society-centered theories, refer at the most basic level to theories which 
 
13 I disagree here with Gwiadza in her assessment that Central and Eastern European countries only receive 
and do not contribute to standards of Europeanization.  Although at the highest policy levels this is 
arguably the case, at other levels there is an ongoing continental dialogue which includes and is influenced 
by these countries. 
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place the development of national consciousness before the advent of modernity (marked 
as beginning in the late 18th century with the French revolution).  In fact, these theories 
encompass a wide variety of ideas from Pierre Van den Berghe’s14 sociobiological 
approach which argues that ethnicity (and by implication nationality) is essentially 
inborn, to less deterministic conceptions of the nation, such as that put forward by Liah 
Greenfield15 who believes based on her historical research that ideas of nationhood 
developed before modernity (especially in England).  Indeed, Greenfield believes that the 
nation helped usher in the age of modernity and not vice versa (as argued by modernist 
theories).  Although encompassing a range of theories, pre-modernist theories are 
commonly grounded in an assumption:  
that group identity is a given.  That there exist in all societies certain primordial, 
irrational attachments based on blood, race, language, religion, region, etc. [that] 
Modern states…are superimposed on the primordial realities which are the ethnic 
groups of communities.  Primordialists believe that ethnic identity is deeply 
rooted in the historical experience of human beings to the point of being 
practically a given.  Sociobiologists [as discussed above with Van den Bergh] 
take this perspective a step further and assert the biological character of 
ethnicity.16 
In contrast, modernist theories of nationalism, which are sometimes referred to as 
constructivist, instrumentalist or elite centered theories, 
maintain that nationalism emerges as a result of the process of transition from 
traditional to modern society; some of these theories focus more specifically on 
the spread of industrialization, and on the socio-economic, political and cultural 
conditions functionally associated with it, as the main cause for the development 
of nationalism.17 
14 Van den Berghe 1978 
15 Liah Greenfield, "Is Nation Unavoidable? Is Nation Unavoidable Today?" In Hanspeter Kriesi et al., 
Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective. Chur: Rügger (1999), 37-54. 
16 Llobera, Josep R. 1999. pg. 3 
17 ibid. pg. 11 
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These theories are put forth in varying ways by Gellner, Breuilly, and Mann.  
Instead of being grounded in an almost atavistic understanding of the origins of national 
attachment, nationalism is viewed primarily as a political construct of elites with no (or 
little) grounding in a reality of cultural history.  Ernst Gellner’s definition is typical of a 
modernist understanding of nationalism.  Gellner argues that, 
nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic 
boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic 
boundaries within a given state—a contingency already formally excluded by the 
principle in its general formulation—should not separate the power-holders from 
the rest.18 
A final, and relatively emergent, theory of nationalism is the ethno-symbolist 
theory characterized by the scholarship of Anthony Smith.  Smith’s work critiques both 
modernist and pre-modernist understandings of nationalism, and as his critiques are 
representative of the most common critiques leveled against these theories of nationalism, 
I will outline them here, before going on to discuss the middle ground he tries to forge 
between the two approaches. 
In critiquing what I have here called the pre-modernist theories of nationalism 
(though as noted earlier this theory goes by many names), Smith outlines three primary 
critiques.  First, he points out that humans have multiple identities and that therefore 
ethnic or national identity has “no absolute priority”19. This begins to break down 
aspects of the pre-modern model as it eliminates the primacy of national bonds and points 
to a failure to explain why they, and not other group identities, take primacy in 
nationalism.  Secondly, he argues that ethnic or national identities are not static, but fluid 
and change over time.  This challenges the notion of longevity and constancy put forth in 
 
18 Gellner, Ernst. 1983. pg. 1 
19 Smith, Anthony. 1989. pg. 33 
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the pre-modernist models of nationalism.  If identities change over time, they cannot be 
grounded in only one, static connection to history.  Changing identities suggest changing 
influences, and changing concepts of self and connection to the past.  Finally, he calls 
attention to the role of individual agency in assigning ones own ethnic identity.  This 
seems to challenge a sense of nations as inborn, as people are able to shift groups, in 
many cases with little difficulty. 
Smith also, and perhaps even more strongly, critiques the more widely accepted 
modernist views of the nation.  Here he points out that while the historical concept is a 
relatively modern development,  
it is…possible to trace the growth of national sentiments which transcend ethnic 
ties back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, if not earlier, in several states of 
Western Europe.20 
He concedes some aspects of the modernist critique of pre-modernist theory, but points 
out that modernist theories have taken the anti-historical perspective to an extreme which 
is contradicted by the historical record.  Secondly, Smith argues that nation building as an 
active process is difficult and not always successful.  The development of a strong state 
does not necessarily bring about a strong national consciousness.  This addresses the 
modernist perspective that nationalism and the nation are a necessary outgrowth of the 
development of the modern state.  Additionally, it points out that identity is somewhat 
more difficult to manipulate than some modernist theorists seem to suggest.  Finally, he 
argues that these theories fail to explain why people will irrationally continue to stand up 
for the nation; why people die for nations.  In other words, where does the passion come 
from if national identity it purely a creation of elites?  This sort of passion, seemingly 
 
20 ibid. pg. 38 
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irrational, must be more deeply grounded than to simply lie in a manipulated mind.  It 
seems that this passion must be connected to a deep sense of attachment to a culture and a 
history that is real, or at least seems very real to the individual.  By attempting to move 
away from deterministic theories of ethnicity and the nation, modernists have neglected 
the very real historical factors and sentiments which play into nationalism.21 
In attempting to move beyond these two definitions, Smith tries to create a 
definition which while recognizing the impact of modernity in helping to shape concepts 
and awareness as well as expressions of nationalism and the nation, also takes into 
account historical rootedness and ties within nationalism.  For Smith, 
Modern nations and nationalism are grounded in pre-existing ethnic ties and their 
political mobilizations, and are formed by this legacy.22 
In developing his “ethno-symbolist” theory of nationalism, Smith is in essence attempting 
to bridge a gap between what have been two highly contentious basic approaches to the 
study of nationalism.  I believe that in this he is successful, and it is in his approach that I 
will attempt to ground my understandings of nationalisms as they develop.  
Before outlining the definition with which I will work in this paper, I would like 
briefly to comment on one other common fallacy in the study of nationalism, and that is 
the inherent negativity of the concept of nationalism.  Often, nationalism is approached 
by scholars, only in terms of its negative impact and consequences and it is assumed that 
the concept itself bears an inherently negative connotation.  In this case, I will attempt to 
overcome this.  It is important to recognize that many sentiments and movements falling 
within the categories of “nationalist” can be productive, positive, and even integrative.  
While much of my study will focus on the negative impacts of nationalism and the 
 
21 ibid. pg. 39-40 
22 ibid. pg. 71 
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negative forms that it takes, it is important to note that the term and concept itself are not 
normatively negative. 
 In this paper then, I will approach nationalism as a feeling of strong, often 
passionate identification with and attachment to a self and group defined idea of the 
nation brought about by both political influences, community and state structures, and a 
consciousness and development of a perceived deep historical connectivity of the group, 
often grounded in cultural factors such as land, language, and religion.  The development 
of nationalist sentiments is not only a process which is informed by elites who construct 
systems which encourage national identities, but also from organic formations of identity 
and consciousness of self and the group.  
This definition draws significantly from Smith’s understanding of nationalism.  
Additionally, instead of viewing nationalism as a purely destructive force, I will try to 
examine it as simply a deep attachment to the nation, and to look at it in the context of its 
influence on political culture.  I hope that this definition will serve to emphasize the 
multiple influences which help to create and encourage nationalism as well as the multi-
directional development which I perceive nationalism as taking. 
17
Chapter 3
A Brief Historical Outline of Slovakia 
Almost as far back as we can trace Slovak history, it is a history of domination.  
The connecting line between individual moments in the history is one of continuous 
control by other groups. 23 Many “important moments”, the points on the timeline of 
Slovakia, are really only the moments when the dominating group changed.  A discussion 
of this tendency can be traced back to the Great Moravian empire, but for the purposes of 
this thesis, I will begin by looking at the period when Slovak national consciousness 
began to develop, and examine the relationship of this development, and the development 
of nationalism, to Slovakia’s interactions with the outside forces which controlled it. 
 The land that now makes up modern day Slovakia was part of the Kingdom of 
Hungary beginning in about 1000 AD, although full incorporation was not achieved until 
the early 1300s.  It was not until the 18th century, however, that a strong movement of 
Slovak national consciousness began to develop.  Following the developments 
throughout Europe at that time (spurred on by the French Revolution), the early years of 
this movement were committed to developing a concept of national identity among 
Slovaks, within the Hungarian Kingdom.  One result of this movement was the 
codification of Slovak as a literary language (as had been done with Czech some time 
before), by Anton Bernolak in the late 18th century.  This language was then reformed 
and improved in the 19th century by Ludovit’ Stur.  The codification of the language was 
one of the first major national projects of the Slovak people.  It allowed for the 
development of newspapers and other publications in Slovak, which contributed to the 
 
23 This section is drawn from a consolidation of accounts of Slovak history from Peter Toma and Dusan 
Kovac’s book Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda and from the Slovak Embassy’s own account. 
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continued strengthening of Slovak national identity, and was one major factors in the 
development of Slovak nationalism. 
 One of the early manifestations of Slovak nationalism, was the struggle for 
autonomy during the wars between Austria and Hungary in the mid 19th century.  At this 
point, the national movement was still controlled by a small group of elites.  While many 
Slovaks fought for the Austrians in this war in hopes of obtaining greater autonomy, most 
peasants were uninvolved in the war, and some even fought for the Hungarians.  The 
elites hoped, however, that siding with the Austrians would lead to greater autonomy.  
Unfortunately, the result was not what they had wished for.  Instead of gaining greater 
autonomy, they became incorporated into the Hungarian area of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire after the end of the war.  This shift in leadership had little tangible impact on 
Slovakia, as they remained minorities under Hungarian rule, and at this time Hungary had 
significant autonomy within the empire. 
 In the end of the 19h century, the Slovaks formed an alliance with the Czechs and 
began to talk more seriously and publicly about their desire for independence.  In the late 
1890s, some Slovaks took part in a conference in Budapest called the Congress of 
Oppressed Peoples, which was one of the most public signs of minority resistance to have 
occurred in Hungary up to this point.  This was worrying to the Hungarian government, 
and marked the strengthening of demands for universal voting rights and independence.  
As the monarchy at this time inched slowly towards a more democratic system (although 
few citizens actually had the right to vote), national movements within Austro-Hungary 
began to strengthen, including among the Slovaks.  This is the period during which the 
first strong, Slovak political parties came into being, including Slovenska Narodna Strana 
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(SNS) or the Slovak National Party, to which the modern SNS (part of the current 
governing coalition) traces its roots.  At the time, however, it was a party who placed 
much of its faith in Russian power and the unity of the Slavs in bringing about Slovak 
independence.  Opposed to this conception were the Roman Catholics, represented by the 
Slovak People’s Party which believed that Slovakia should focus on small steps, and 
improvements gradually in the direction of stronger national character.  Finally, under the 
Social Democratic Party (founded in 1905), the intelligentsia, especially represented by 
the youth, and taking cues from the Slovak language journal “Hlas”, supported the 
actions of the Catholics, but focused on Czecho-Slovak cooperation as a path towards 
greater autonomy and independence for the Slovak nation.  They also tended to represent 
the interests of protestants, and so the divide between this group and the Catholics was 
partially grounded in religious and not only ideological differences. 
 The early years of the 20th century leading up to WWI were challenging times for 
Slovaks, but also marked some of the earliest successes of the national movement.  
During this period, the Slovaks managed to have 7 deputies elected to the Hungarian 
parliament, and this strengthened the sense of national character among Slovaks.  The 
Hungarian government’s response, however, was oppressive and even violent.  It was 
during this period that Magyarization (movements by the Hungarian government to try to 
make all citizens more Hungarian) reached its height.  All students were required to 
attend school, and all instruction was conducted in Hungarian.  A particularly poignant 
event from this period was the killing of 15 Slovaks by Hungarian authorities during the 
consecration of a church at Cernova.  When the Hungarians refused to allow Andrej 
Hlinka, a popular priest and Slovak political figure who helped found the Slovak People’s 
20
Party, to bless the church the Slovaks protested, and were violently silenced by the 
Hungarian police.  In response to this increased opression, Slovak nationalism began to 
be strengthened as an oppositional force to Hungarian control. 
 During the early 20th century, a movement of Slovaks (and Czechs) abroad also 
began to play a significant role in the Slovak national movements, and especially in the 
struggle for independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  The Czecho-Slovak 
National Council, headquartered in Paris, as well as organizations in the United States 
were particularly important during this time.  As the national movement was increasingly 
suppressed throughout wartime within the Slovak territory of the Empire, Slovaks living 
abroad kept the struggle alive and began to formulate plans for the creation of an 
independent Czecho-Slovak republic. 
 In 1915, Czechs and Slovaks abroad declared the creation of a federated Czech 
and Slovak state through the Cleveland Agreement.  This was followed in May of 1917, 
in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, when T.G. Masaryk, who would go on to be the first president 
of Czechoslovakia, signed an agreement along with other Czechs and Slovaks abroad 
which guaranteed a certain level of autonomy for the Slovak lands within this federated 
Czecho-Slovak republic.  The creation of this state with the support of allied powers, 
however, did not occur until late October 1918.  Its borders were later secured under the 
various international peace treaties resulting from the end of the First World War. 
 The interwar Czechoslovak state is often held up as the only true example of 
successful democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar period.  It is true 
that, from an economic perspective, Czechoslovakia at this time was one of the most 
successful states in Europe.  Additionally, the state had a democratic structure which was 
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far superior to other systems in the region.  This, however, belies the underlying sense of 
domination felt by many Slovaks. 
 Slovaks were at a distinct disadvantage in Czechoslovakia in many ways.  Firstly, 
they represented a minority, and some numbers would seem to indicate that they were not 
even the largest minority (this position being held by the Germans who at this time were 
still the majority in some parts of the western Czech lands).  This numerical 
disadvantage, however, was coupled with a much more crippling economic and industrial 
disadvantage.  The Czech lands had had a very different place in the world of the last few 
centuries.  Czech industry was already at a relatively high level of development, and 
because they had been under less repression, national institutions such as schools in the 
Czech language, were already present.  In Slovakia, on the other hand, industrial 
development had been severely hindered by their position within the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy.  Slovakia remained largely agricultural and didn’t have much of the national 
infrastructure present in Moravia and the Czech lands. 
 These disadvantages were exacerbated in the Slovak consciousness by the 
growing emphasis of many individuals in the government on the development of a 
Czechoslovak national consciousness.  This was problematic, because Slovak national 
consciousness had only recently been solidified, and threatened to be subsumed within 
this larger collective understanding of the nation (which also was, consequently, the 
understanding of the nation embodied in the Czechoslovak constitution).  Additionally, 
because most of the high-ranking government officials were Czechs and there were very 
few positions, even within Slovakia, occupied by Slovaks, there was a strong de facto 
emphasis on the “Czech” in Czechoslovak.  All of these philosophical issues of identity 
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and nation coupled with the already growing resentment among Slovaks of their position 
of social disadvantage, and their broad exclusion from powerful government position, 
sparked the beginning of the Slovak autonomy movement in the interwar period. 
 This movement was beginning to grow, but had not yet been addressed by the 
government, when Hitler began threatening the lands to Germany’s east.  Under 
increasing pressure from Hitler, in the fall of 1938 Czecho-Slovakia was forced to cede 
large parts of its territory to both the West and the South to Germany and Hungary 
respectively.  Later during that same fall, the Czecho-Slovak government, now strongly 
influenced by Nazi control, granted autonomy to Slovakia.  The following spring, 
Slovakia achieved full independence after which the government quickly devolved into a 
one party system led by general Jozef Tiso.  This independent Slovak state would be 
strongly influenced by the Nazi regime in Germany, and by fascist ideology. 
 Under the fascist government of the independent Slovak Republic, genocide was 
committed against the Jews on a mass scale.  Very few of Slovakia’s Jews came out of 
World War II alive.  In terms of actual battle, however, Slovakia’s participation in the 
war was relatively minimal in comparison to other countries.  In fact, conditions during 
the war were reasonably good, as war created jobs and some economic opportunities.  
Nonetheless, there was a fairly large resistance movement which began from the very 
beginning of the fascist control of the state.  Many Slovaks joined the Soviet army, and 
became members of Czecho-Slovak divisions of that army.  Indeed, according to the 
Slovak embassy’s rendition of history, by the end of the war more Slovaks were fighting 
for the Allied forces than for the Germans who officially controlled the state, though 
these numbers may not be entirely accurate. 
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Late in the war, the Slovak National Council formed and began, along with the 
Czecho-Slovak government in exile in London, to plan a national uprising.  This uprising, 
which took place in 1944, eventually was defeated by Germany.  For a few months, 
however, Slovak rebels held large sections of central Slovakia and ruled as an unofficial 
government, also creating new political parties and operating a rebel radio station.  This 
also helped to cement some ideas of Slovak national consciousness, as it was one of the 
first times that Slovakia had acted in its own interest with little assistance from the 
outside world.  Slovak national identity was thus cemented in two powerful, but 
conflicting ways: through the support of the independent state and through the resistance 
movement.  In this way, Slovak national identity was both strengthened and polarized. 
 Following the end of the Second World War, negotiations began in relation to the 
formation of the post-war state.  Because Czechoslovakia had been liberated by the 
Soviets, and also because of persistent pan-Slavic understandings of international 
relations among many in both the Czech lands and Slovakia, these negotiations were 
strongly influenced by the Soviets.  In fact, the initial meetings which determined the 
structure of the new state were held in Moscow.  During many of these negotiations, 
Slovak delegates were largely excluded.  In the initial negotiations, Slovaks were only 
included in discussions regarding Czech and Slovak relations in the new state.  The 
outcome of the meetings in Moscow and the subsequent meeting between Czech and 
Slovak groups in Kosice was an agreement to a generally democratic governmental 
structure in which Slovaks would be granted considerable autonomy, and which 
recognized the Czechs and Slovaks as separate, equal nations.  This would never actually 
be a fully realized policy, as politics tended to remain dominated from Prague. 
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In the first free elections, held in 1946, the majority of Slovaks voted for the 
Democratic Party.  Because, however, the majority of Czechs voted for the Communist 
Party, and Czechs held the majority in the country, the Communist Party received a total 
of 38% of the voted in the entire country, giving it a majority.  Eventually, in 1948, the 
communist party seized complete control of Czechoslovakia. 
 Communist Czechoslovakia would be the next dominating force in the history of 
Slovakia.  Having been minorities, and often persecuted minorities, within the Kingdom 
of Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian empire, the first Czecho-Slovak state (despite 
promises to the contrary), and having lacked full control over their own country during 
the fascist years of the first independent Slovak Republic, Slovaks hoped that under 
communism they would at least have the greater autonomy promised to them under the 
Moscow and Kosice agreements.  To some extent, this would be a reality.  Especially 
later during the communist years, Slovakia did, in fact, gain greater autonomy from other 
states than it had probably ever possessed.  Many Slovaks did participate in the 
Czechoslovak government during the communist years. One of the most famous attempts 
at liberalization in communist history, the concept of socialism with a human face during 
the Prague Spring, was conceptualized and led by Alexandr Dubcek, a Slovak.  However, 
with the exception of this brief period the country remained under strict communist rule, 
controlled to a large degree from Moscow, and it is hard to argue that the country had any 
real autonomy. 
 Nonetheless, Slovakia was given a certain level of control over its own affairs, 
within the structure of the communist party system, especially after the Soviets put down 
the liberalization of the Prague Spring and federalized the Czechoslovak state.  Decisions 
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were no longer solely, or even primarily, controlled from Prague.  This greater level of 
autonomy may help to explain why the resistance movement to communism was much 
less outspoken in Slovakia, than in the Czech Republic. 
 In the Czech lands, underground resistance movements among intellectuals grew 
up quite strongly relatively early in the communist period.  Slovakia’s resistance 
movement had a much different, and much quieter face.  Grounded in the work of some 
Catholic priests, Slovakia’s resistance was primarily a religious one (though Slovak 
intellectual dissidents did participate with Czech dissidents in Prague), and much of the 
most outspoken actions of political dissent by Slovaks took place in the Czech lands and 
not in Slovakia.  As such, Slovakia never fully developed the large, underground 
intellectual network that developed in the Czech Republic. 
 When resistance began to rise in the late 1980s, and under Gorbachev the Soviet 
Union began to gradually loosen its strangle hold on the independent states of Eastern 
and Central Europe, most of the activity was happening in Prague.  Although some of the 
250 people who had signed the Charter 77 declaration in 1977 demanding improved 
human rights standards were Slovaks, the majority were Czechs, as well as most high 
ranking members of the resistance movement.  This lack of a strong dissident movement 
meant that Slovaks did not develop the same underground intellectual class as the 
Czechs.  When the communist system was finally dissolved, it was the Czechs who took 
the greatest control of the country, because it was largely the Czechs who had the 
capacity to do so. 
 From the very beginning of the newly independent Czechoslovak state, there were 
problems negotiating the role that Slovaks would play in the government.  An inability to 
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agree on these issues was one of the primary motivating factors for the division of the 
single state into two in 1992.  This marked the first time in Slovak history where it would 
be a truly independent state.  Even during its brief period of independence, its sovereignty 
was limited by German oversight.  It is in this context that was can begin to look at the 
relationship between Slovakia and the European Union. 
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Chapter 4
EU History and the Development of a European Political Vision 
 Before examining the interaction between Slovak and EU political visions, it is 
important to define what the EU’s political vision is. In this chapter, I will outline the 
history and development of the European Union.  Beginning with the early creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and following the development of this initial 
organization through to the European Union as it exists today, I will look at the process 
through which the EU has shaped its vision of the European political world.  Finally, I 
will outline the characteristics which define the EU’s political vision and its goals for the 
future of Europe. 
The early history of the European Union lies in the aftermath of the Second World 
War and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.  This 
idea, as first announced by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in mid-1950, 
dictated that French and German coal and steel would be pooled together and governed 
by a common “High Authority”24. Although the union between these countries was to be 
an economic one, the theory underlying its creation was based on the idea of creating 
greater European security and stability.  As such, it was integrally linked with concepts of 
nationalism. 
 Having just come out of a major nationalist conflict, France and Germany 
recognized a need for change.  Past attempts by individual nations to take control of the 
European continent, driven by nationalist rhetoric, had led to two major European wars in 
less than half a century.  Although not using the word “nationalism” these states 
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addressed their fear of its resurgence and/or continuation in the preamble to the founding 
treaty.  After asserting the centrality of peace to the project, the preamble goes on to say 
that the states signing it are: 
Resolved to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; 
to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and 
deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the 
foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward 
shared.25 
The “age old rivalries” of Europeans had been national, and the preamble suggested the 
elimination of divisions on this basis in favor of a unification of European interests.  They 
advocated the creation of a community whose future would be a shared one, not hindered 
by national particularity, but strengthened by each of its members. 
 Economics was a reasonable place to start.  By sacrificing a level of national 
sovereignty to the sovereignty of a collective authority, states were binding themselves to 
one another in a web of interconnectedness.  As Schuman declared when he announced 
the creation of the community, this interdependence of resources would make “any war 
between France and Germany…not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”26.
Economic unification would bring positive results for all states, while allowing them to 
retain their sovereignty in most issues.  In the end not only France and Germany, but also 
Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty in Paris in 1951, establishing “the ECSC High Authority, to which 
member governments transferred their sovereign powers.”27. This organization laid the 
foundation for the development, over the next half century of an increasingly large and 
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increasingly interdependent union of states, which eventually developed into the 
European Union. 
 While economic union, especially in the early years was relatively successful and 
fairly widely embraced in the 6 member countries of the ECSC, early attempts to move 
from a purely economic union and consolidate military and political programs were 
unsuccessful. In 1957 the ECSC members, as a part of the Treaty of Rome, created the 
European Economic Community (EEC) which consolidated their markets and economic 
policies beyond simply coal and steel, and further established the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM), which consolidated policies on nuclear power.  These 
first decades of European community, however, were primarily focused on solidifying 
and strengthening the economic union created by the ECSC and creating the institutions 
to support it.  It was not until the late 1980s, however, that a unified Europe as we know 
it today would begin to solidify.28 
In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was passed.  This marked the first major 
successful attempt by the European Community to progress from simple economic union 
and towards increasing political and cultural union.  This act increased the powers of the 
European Community so that they included issues such as the creation of common 
foreign and environmental policy.  It also created institutional changes which made it 
easier to make decisions at a European level.  Finally, it strengthened many of the 
economic ideas which had been laid out in the treaty of Rome.  Consolidation of policies 
under this treaty, however, was not entirely successful.  Instead, it laid the foundation for 
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the Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union, 6 years later which 
would officially create the “European Union”.29 
The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, represented an even clearer shift than the 
SEA in the goals of the European Community.  It embodied a commitment to much 
broader unification of policies across the community.  It was this treaty that opened the 
way for political, and eventually cultural, unification which has dramatically changed the 
shape of European unification since.  According to the European Union, the treaty 
“responded to 5 key goals”: 
1. Strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the institutions 
2. Improving the effectiveness of the institutions 
3. Establishing economic and monetary union 
4. Developing the Community social dimension 
5. Establishing a common foreign and security policy30 
In responding to these goals, the treaty created the European Union, which it founded 
upon three pillars.   
The first pillar was “the European Communities”31. This pillar encompassed all 
of the policy established by the ECSC, EURATOM, as well as the economic and 
monetary union as laid out by earlier treaties, and expanded within the Maastricht treaty.  
This pillar also included an expansion of cooperation in policies related to research, 
education and the environment.  In general, it covers areas of policy where “Member 
States share their sovereignty via the Community institutions”32.
The second pillar called for the implementation of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), which was suggested by earlier treaties, but whose creation was only 
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clearly called for under the Maastricht Treaty.  The recommendations laid out by 
Maastricht are meant to replace earlier recommendations in previous treaties.  It did not, 
however, fully unify foreign policies across the union.  Instead, it allowed and suggested 
that states take action together, but was based not on EU enforcement, but on 
intergovernmental cooperation and consensus.  The third pillar of the European Union is 
the unification of “justice and home affairs”33, and called for intergovernmental 
cooperation in these areas. 
Although Maastricht did not create a federal European state, as some had thought 
was the direction of the European Union, it did reform the core ideals of the organization.  
Having begun with the goal of preventing nationalist conflict and creating a more secure, 
successful Europe, the European Union was now a fully political and, in many ways, 
cultural union, at least on paper.  It created European citizenship, making all citizens of 
member states citizens of the Union as well.  Citizenship was a codification of the EU’s 
goal of creating a supranational identity which would supercede or at least work in 
concert with national identity.  The European Union was no longer a purely economic 
union, but a union which encompassed many aspects of politics, culture, and daily life for 
people in member states. 
Since Maastricht, the European Union has reformed its functions through both the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice.  It has remained committed, however, to the 
expanded unification of the European community as laid out in Maastricht, and has 
sought, throughout the 1990s and early 21st century the creation of even greater 
convergence of policy. 
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The final, and perhaps clearest evidence of the EU’s push for increased 
supranationality, is the failed treaty on the European Constitution34. The creation of an 
EU constitution in the form suggested would have marked another major milestone in 
European history.  Many states felt, however, that the constitution represented 
federalization to too great a degree, and their citizens were unwilling to support it in the 
end.  Some also felt that it was too great a sacrifice of national sovereignty.  The fact that 
it was opposed in referendum by both French and Dutch voters is an especially strong 
sign that Europe is not ready for such a move, as these states have traditionally been two 
of the strongest supporters of the European Union.35 
The European Union has come a long way from its first conception as a steel and 
coal sharing treaty between France and Germany.  From the original six members it has 
grown, this year, to 27.  Its members now include states who were under communist 
control when the Union was founded, and whose histories suggest that their integration 
into the Union will be a particularly interesting process.  The European Union is now a 
large, supranational organization whose reach extends into issues of politics, agriculture, 
security, and even culture.  Its core political project is one of supranationality; the 
creation of a group of states whose citizens see themselves as integrally linked to the 
larger collective of members.  Its aim is the creation of a European identity, “united in 
diversity”, and the unification of the policies of those states which are part of the 
European community. 
Looking at the EU’s development, and drawing heavily on the Treaty of 
Maastricht, and on the European Union’s own literature, I define the EU’s political vision 
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as encompassing four major characteristics: supranationality, democracy, respect for 
human and minority rights, and social responsibility.  In many ways, despite all the 
changes that have taken place in the Union in the past few decades, these core political 
ideals are not so different from those embodied by the early incarnations of the EU.  
Today, the EU views supranationality in a much broader way than it did in its early 
conceptions, but supranationality was always central to a project of European 
Unification.  Democracy is embodied today by the EU’s attempts to create strong, 
democratic states on its Eastern borders, but is also in evidence in the structure of the 
early institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community.  Respect for minority and 
human rights has become much more central in EU discourse, but the human rights 
regime developed concurrently with the development of the European community, and 
there was always a link between the two.  Finally, a sense of social responsibility is 
central to the EU’s vision.  This developed most concretely with the treaty of Maastricht, 
however, it is embodied in the economic policies of early European collectives. 
As I have said the EU has changed significantly throughout the years.  In terms of 
core values, however, much as stayed the same.  EU institutions have developed to better 
assert its political vision, and to spread that vision throughout Europe.  In the next 
sections I will examine how successful this process of transmission and expansion has 
been. 
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Chapter 5
The Accession Process and Slovakia’s Path to Membership 
In order to begin discussing how Slovakia conforms to the EU’s political vision, I 
will begin with an examination of the history of interaction between Slovakia and the 
European Union.  This began right after the fall of communism, while Slovakia was still 
a part of Czechoslovakia, and continues till the present day.  Here, I will briefly outline 
the EU accession process, and discuss the way this process occurred in Slovakia.  The 
focus here will be on creating a picture of how relationships between Slovakia and the 
EU developed, and the process that Slovakia went through in trying to conform to the 
EU’s political vision and gain membership to the Union. 
European Union membership has been seen in Slovakia as a marker of the sort of 
economic and political stability which they have worked towards since the fall of 
communism, as well as representing a cultural ‘return to Europe’.  Beyond the clear 
monetary and political benefits perceived to come with accession, there is also a strong 
sense of national pride that is at stake among ordinary people in the struggle for EU 
membership.  European Union membership became a symbol of Slovakia’s return to its 
rightful place in the European community. 
The road to EU accession is a long and arduous one for even the most stable 
candidate countries.  For countries like Slovakia, whose political climate has oscillated 
somewhat unpredictably between promoting strong, western European style democratic 
principles and more nationalist, isolationist policy, the process was even more 
challenging. Although Slovakia successfully joined the European Union in 2004, in 1998 
it had been originally excluded from the group of states expected to join in the next 
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accession, instead having been classified, along with Romania and Bulgaria, as a state 
which had made insufficient progress towards membership to warrant serious 
consideration of immediate accession.  In this chapter I will outline the accession process 
as a whole looking both at the process as it stands now, and how the process was different 
for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) than it was for earlier accession 
states.  I will then proceed to a discussion of this process as it occurred in Slovakia. 
 
The Accession Process
At the most basic level, the criteria for accession to the EU are extraordinarily 
simple.  As defined by the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, all states wishing to join the 
European Union must meet the following three criteria: 
1. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities. 
2. Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. 
3. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.36 
The simple wording and layout of these standards is, however, misleading.  
Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, for many of the CEECs creating a strong, 
democratic political climate, a functioning market economy and developing the 
institutional stability to allow them to fulfill obligations of EU membership is no mean 
feat.  The accession process, however, is complicated in ways that go beyond the obvious 
challenges of shifting an entire governmental system. 
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Firstly, the Copenhagen criteria as the basic expectations for membership have 
been written vaguely, with no explanation of what it would mean to “achieve stability”, 
“have a functioning market economy”, etc.  This lack of specificity leads to considerable 
confusion regarding the precise expectations which must be met in order for membership 
to be granted. Given the diversity of economic styles, minority protection strategies, 
governmental structures, etc. in current EU member states it is perhaps understandable 
that standards for accession would be vague, allowing for a broad number of effective 
solutions to institutional problems and the development of varied, case based solutions 
for improvement of governmental systems, economic markets, and rights protection laws.  
In reality, however, the accession process, especially as it has developed in the most 
recent accessions, allows for very little of this sort of individuality.37 
Despite the lack of specificity in the actual standards required for membership, 
the EU seems to have developed a set of increasingly specific de facto standards for 
accession states.  As Heather Grabbe has pointed out, 
Considering the variety of models of capitalism to be found among EU member 
states, the accession policy documents (particularly the Accession Partnerships…) 
promote a remarkably uniform view of what a “market economy” should look 
like.38 
We can see a similar trend in the promotion of minority language laws and other human 
rights standards as the primary path towards minority protection, as well as in the 
expanded understanding of what is needed to fulfill the “obligations of membership”.  
Previously this condition was considered to require the  
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implementation of the acquis communitaire which amounts to 80,000 pages of 
legislative texts already, but it keeps growing as the Union develops new policies 
and issues new directives, declarations, and jurisprudence.39 
For the CEECs, however,  
The acquis has been defined more broadly as “all the real and potential rights and 
obligations of the EU system and its institutional framework.” 40 
Especially given what Grabbe calls the “maximalist” interpretation of this definition by 
the European Union, this means that the accession process for the CEECs is much less 
flexible and case based than earlier accession procedures.  In earlier accessions, the 
process was much more focused on a cooperative, mutually beneficial negotiation 
process allowing for concessions, opt outs, and special intergovernmental agreements.  
The relationships mirrored, in many ways, a productive business relationship between 
two companies. 
 In contrast, the relationship between the European Union and the CEECs has been 
more akin to that of a strict parent to a misbehaving child, with firm consequences and 
denial of privileges if rules are not followed exactly as presented.  While, “Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain were allowed into the Union with the aim of helping them 
consolidate democracy after entry”41, the CEECs are expected to have fully complied 
with all EU standards at their time of entry.  Additionally, while there are very limited 
possibilities for transitional periods or special arrangements for the CEECs, the European 
Union has placed strong, and somewhat long-term, limitations on some of the most 
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important rewards associated with joining the Union, such as access to free movement of 
labor and open borders.  
It is important to note this power differential within the accession process.  In some 
ways, it seems obvious that the European Union would hold the power in the accession 
process, but within the current structure, candidate states retain almost no autonomous 
power within this process.  This has not always been true, and the results of the one-way 
conversation that represents the current accession process can be extremely detrimental to 
candidate countries. 
 The Accession Process in Slovakia
The problems with the accession process can be especially frustrating for a state 
like Slovakia, whose path to Union membership was so fraught with difficulty.  Although 
Slovakia’s negotiations with the European Union initially began during the early 90s as 
part of Czechoslovakia, its progress very quickly deteriorated after the Velvet Divorce 
under the government of Vladimir Meciar. 
 By the time Slovakia became an independent state in 1993, it had, as a part of 
Czechoslovakia, begun many of the initial steps towards joining the EU by beginning to 
network with international and European organizations, as well as becoming party to 
various conventions and establishing trade agreements.  Immediately after independence, 
Slovakia renegotiated a Europe Agreement as an independent state, joined the OSCE, the 
Council of Europe, and the UN, as well as joining NATO's Partnership for Peace 
Programme.  Despite these initial positive signs, even in the early years of independence, 
under the third Meciar government of 1994-1998, significant problems of implementation 
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and democracy building arose which caused problems for Slovakia in creating further 
movement towards EU accession. 
As Geoffrey Pridham explains in his article comparing the Meciar government 
with the much more pro-EU government of Mikulas Dzurinda which followed it,  
Meciar’s policy, while continuous with that pursued since the end of communism, 
left doubts about the priority accorded relations with the EU.  Notwithstanding 
formal initiatives, like making an application for EU membership early in his 
third government in June 1995, the strategic commitment to follow through with 
necessary measures was not strong.42 
Throughout the mid-1990s, the Meciar government continually failed to fulfill the 
obligations necessary for EU accession.  The EU issued a series of demarches, or
“official criticisms”, mainly expressing  
concern over the growing power of the executive in Slovak politics, attempts to 
undermine parliamentary control and opposition parties, assaults on the 
independent media and moves to discriminate against the Hungarian minority in 
official matters.43 
The Slovak government’s response to these criticisms was less than optimal.   
These reactions ranged from partial denial or downplaying of a problem, and 
assertions of procedural rectitude or misunderstanding of the Slovak position, to 
denunciation of intervention in internal affairs or attacks on the opposition parties 
for giving Slovakia a bad name abroad (as they tended to provide the EU with 
evidence of abuses of power at home).44 
In addition to the government’s general lack of positive response to the growing 
concerns of the European Union and other international organizations, the Meciar 
government was unable to effectively function in the Western diplomatic world.  A more 
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eastern orientation (Meciar was fond of discussing Slovakia as a bridge between east and 
west), combined with a weak diplomatic corps which lacked both linguistic skills and 
adeptness in interactions with western elites, made the formation of important bilateral 
relationships with western countries very difficult. 
 By 1997 “there was talk about terminating the Europe Agreement with 
Slovakia.”45, but this did not cause a significant change in Meciar’s policy.  As a result, 
Slovakia was not invited, along with the Czech Republic and some of the other CEECs, 
to begin official negotiations for European Union membership.  This was one of several 
motivating factors which led to the formation of an alliance among various opposition 
parties in Slovakia in advance of the 1998 elections.  The mobilization of the opposition 
in response to the authoritarian practices of the Meciar government led to a victory in 
1998 by Mikulas Dzurinda, and the creation of a new, four party democratic coalition.46 
Almost immediately, the newly formed coalition government instituted a 
dramatically improved approach to relations with Brussels.  Possessing both the political 
will and the diplomatic savvy that Meciar had lacked, Dzurinda visited Brussels only 
days after his election and established the European Commission/Slovakia High Level 
Working Group to help recreate positive movement towards accession.  This was the first 
of a number of steps which began to open a better conversation between Slovakia and the 
European Union.  Additionally, Dzurinda very quickly improved the diplomatic corps, 
strengthened international inter-party ties, and provided increased access for the 
European Union to high level Slovak government officials.47 
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While Slovakia’s problems with EU accession hardly disappeared with the change 
in government, reports were continually and overwhelmingly positive throughout the late 
1990s.  Despite some challenging intra-coalition disagreements, official opinions from 
EU sources as well as international organizations and the United States (who had been 
one of the key players in keeping Slovakia from full NATO membership) were optimistic 
about Slovakia’s path towards stable democracy.  In late 1999, Slovakia entered official 
negotiations for EU membership and in 2000 became a full member of NATO.48 
The changes which occurred from the very beginning of the Dzurinda government 
allowed Slovakia to move more or less smoothly along the path towards EU accession.  
While there continued to be tensions between members of the coalition government, and 
some struggles with implementation, especially regarding contentious issues like 
minority language laws, the strengthened relationship between Brussels and Bratislava, as 
well as the ongoing commitment of the Dzurinda government to EU accession, kept these 
problems somewhat in check.49 
Having been initially excluded from the group of countries expected to join the 
EU in the early 21st century, Slovakia’s remarkable progress following 1998 led to the 
country’s accession, along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and most of the other 
North and Central Eastern European countries in 2004.  This membership should have 
marked the achievement, by Slovakia, of substantial convergence of policy with the 
European Union and a dedication to the political goals of the European Union.  The rest 
of this paper will examine how well Slovakia actually conforms to the EU’s political 
vision, and the relationship between this vision and Slovakia’s own political culture. 
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Chapter 6
Voter Behavior and the European Union 
The first level of analysis at which I which I will evaluate Slovakia’s relationship 
with the European Union’s political vision is that of voter behavior.  Focusing on the 
referendum on EU membership in 2003 and the most recent parliamentary elections in 
2006, I will explore the way that voter behavior reflects support for the European Union’s 
political program.  By evaluating the choices that Slovaks make, and the ways that those 
choices are influenced, we can gain a better understanding of the way that citizens engage 
(or choose not to) with the political world in and beyond their country. 
Referendum on European Union Membership
The Slovak referendum on the European Union took place in May of 2003.  This 
referendum was exceptional in the history of the European Union for two key reasons.  
The first, and most often commented upon, way in which this referendum stood out from 
others was in the percentage of voters who voted in support of EU membership.  
Although throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the EU had enjoyed relatively high 
levels of support in similar referendums, the Slovak case had the highest percentage of 
‘yes’ votes ever recorded in an EU referendum.  Although numbers range from 93-95%, 
Karen Henderson, evaluating valid votes instead of total votes, puts the percentage at 
93.71%  votes in favor of EU membership.50 
This extraordinary level of support, interesting on its own, is even more 
interesting when examined in combination with the other way that the Slovak referendum 
was unique.  While no other referendum produced such a high number of ‘yes’ votes, the 
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Slovak referendum also had the second lowest level of voter turnout of any of the 
referendums on EU membership.  Only 52.15% of the population voted, and the 
threshold of validity was only passed in the last hour of the referendum.51 
Karen Henderson has evaluated the significance of this in great detail in her 
article “EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus”.  She points to a number of 
factors which influenced this outcome.  Firstly, she argues that what the EU referendum 
was measuring was not the inherent support for the EU as an institution.  By the time 
referendums were held in Slovakia and other Central and Eastern European countries, 
“there was no realistic alternative to EU membership for the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe”.  Economically and politically, it would have been disastrous not to join the 
EU.52 
Henderson argues, in a second article, that because Slovaks did not perceive 
opposition to the EU as an appealing option, EU membership came to represent a set of 
cultural and social issues which were highly salient in the Slovak consciousness, and 
intricately linked with the Slovak sense of self and of the nation.  Henderson argues that 
Pro-EU attitudes reflect a symbolic adherence to the notion of a “return to 
Europe” which assumes that the demands of EU membership are merely a 
blueprint for returning countries to the positions they would have been in if they 
had not been subjected to communist rule.53 
She goes on to argue that opposition to the EU in Slovakia is thus related not to an 
opposition to the institution as such, but to a general opposition to the project of 
democratization and Europeanization.  Those opposing the EU tend to be those who 
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“have alternative images of what their country would have been like had it been able to 
follow an indigenously determined path in the second half of the 20th century.”54 These 
tend to be those who are nostalgic for either the communist of fascist periods of Slovak 
history.  We can also see this by looking at the makeup of the voters, where Henderson 
observes that “the prominence of supporters of the unreformed Communist Party of 
Slovakia among ‘no’ voters suggests that the underlying issue was regime change”55. As 
such, the referendum did not truly represent an evaluation of the support for EU 
membership, but was instead a vote on Slovakia’s return to Europe, and its right to be a 
member of the European community in general, which was something which few Slovaks 
opposed. 
 Because of the perception of EU membership as returning Slovakia to its rightful 
place in Europe (as noted above), it also became political suicide for a party to openly 
oppose to the EU.  Even the previously very Euroskeptical HZDS supported the EU as 
Slovakia approached referendum.  This meant that leading up to the referendum there 
was no open opposition to the EU, and therefore no political debate, and no concerted 
effort at a ‘no’ campaign.  This lack of debate combined with the a sense that EU 
membership was a necessity for the future of Slovakia meant that many “voters with a 
level of antipathy towards the EU, together with a lack of interest and information, 
reacted by withdrawing from politics and staying home.”56 
Thus the EU referendum was primarily a measure of Slovaks’ commitment to 
continued transition and democratization in general as opposed to strong support for EU 
institutions and the process of European integration specifically.  This is not to argue that 
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Slovaks did not support the EU (which will be explored more deeply in the following 
chapters), but that referendum outcomes alone do not describe the true level of support 
within Slovak society.  It is also important to observe the overwhelming lack of debate in 
the lead up to EU membership, and therefore very little information on the possible 
negative impacts of EU integration. 
 2006 Parliamentary Elections
The 2006 elections were the first since Slovakia had joined the European Union.  
In the months leading up to the elections, there was much speculation among scholars 
and in the press as to who would win the election, and even more importantly who that 
party would choose as its coalition partners.  There were only two parties who were really 
in a position to receive the most votes, according to polling data before the election: the 
ruling SDKU (Democratic and Christian Union) led by Mikulas Dzurinda, and the 
relatively young Smer, a socialist party, led by Robert Fico.  In the end, Smer received 
just under 30% percent of the votes, with the SDKU earning only a little more than 
18%.57 
This outcome was extremely important in terms of defining the Slovak political 
orientation.  The SDKU under Dzurinda’s leadership had pulled Slovakia out of 
international isolation, and turned the country’s international image around.  His coalition 
had been almost single handedly responsible for gaining Slovakia membership in the 
European Union.  Nonetheless, SDKU was unable to retain its place in the government, 
and was replaced by Smer. 
 Smer, led by Robert Fico, was a relatively young party founded in 2000.  The 
party had run on a platform of overturning the reforms created by the Dzurinda 
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government, especially in terms of fiscal policy and taxation.  Robert Fico, who became 
prime minister after the elections, was something of an unpredictable character.  In the 
past, he had been compared to a younger version of Vladimir Meciar, the man who led 
Slovakia into international isolation in the 1990s.  He had a history of anti-minority 
rhetoric towards both the Roma and Hungarian communities, and had always taken a 
somewhat Euroskeptical approach to relationships with the EU.  Many scholars, however, 
believed that these had been mistakes of youth, and that he had moved more towards a 
mainstream, pro-western political platform.58 
The results of this election are intriguing, especially so soon after gaining 
European Union membership.  One might anticipate that Dzurinda’s SDKU, having been 
largely responsible for Slovakia’s gaining membership in the European Union, would 
have enjoyed a relatively high level of popularity among Slovak citizens.  Given the high 
levels of support for the EU which seemed to be evident in the referendum (despite the 
issues associated with low turnout), it is somewhat surprising that the party to win the 
most votes in the 2006 elections was one that ran on a platform of overturning some of 
the very policies which had gained Slovakia entry into the EU and legitimacy in the 
international community. 
 One possible explanation for this seemingly contradictory outcome is related to 
Henderson’s explanation of the EU referendum results.  Given that the EU referendum 
seems to have been less a referendum on EU institutions as such, and more concretely a 
referendum on Slovak return to Europe and democratization in general, the results of the 
election may actually begin to illuminate the real points of Slovak support.  While 
Slovaks support EU membership as a concept, and as an unavoidable step in the 
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continuation of Slovak success as a state (as demonstrated by the EU referendum), they 
tend not to actually agree with many of the policies which line up most closely with the 
EU’s political goals as we can see in the lack of support garnered by Dzurinda’s party in 
the most recent elections.  Although Dzurinda had been an attractive candidate in 
previous years because his party represented the promise of successful EU accession, 
once such accession was achieved, Slovaks were less willing to actively support the 
actual policies which brought about this success. 
 In any case, the results of both of these votes demonstrate a complexity in the 
behavior of the Slovak citizenry in voting, and also suggest a complicated relationship 
between the values of Slovak citizens and the values of the EU.  These issues will be 
explored more deeply in the later analysis chapter.  
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Chapter 7
Political Party Behavior and the European Union 
 
The second level of analysis at which I will examine the relationship between 
Slovak and EU political values is the behavior and programs of political parties in 
Slovakia.  First, I will look at Smer’s choice of coalition partners in evaluating the party’s 
underlying political goals.  Then, looking at behavior since the formation of the coalition, 
I will analyze the way that this behavior compares to and responds to the EU’s core 
political vision. 
 Coalition Formation
Given the distribution of votes, and the unpredictability of Fico as a political 
player, the choices made in coalition formation following the 2006 elections were of 
particular importance. Kevin Deegan-Kraus, in his post-election analysis, identifies eight 
possible coalitions which could be formed in order to create a majority.  Two of these 
would have excluded Smer as a coalition partner, but would have required a significant 
level of cooperation between parties which were unlikely to cooperate, and so it seemed 
most likely from the beginning that Smer would form the government.59 
The coalition which Smer formed, however, was one which had been referred to 
in the past as the “worst-case scenario”60, and which few people predicted would be the 
coalition choice.  He joined forces with the ultra-nationalist SNS (Slovak National Party) 
and the HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), which under the leadership of 
Vladimir Meciar had driven the Slovak reputation and economy into the ground in the 
1990s.  
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One analyst at Transitions Online Magazine made a forceful argument in the days 
after the election and before the formation of the coalition in which he argued that a 
coalition between Smer, SNS and HZDS was a virtual impossibility.  The commentator 
argues that, 
Fico would be making a bad miscalculation to team up with Meciar…By 
partnering with Meciar, Fico would gain no fresh votes, could lose some, and 
would almost certainly ensure he could not gain more votes come the next 
elections.  The same is also true (probably even truer) about any link-up with the 
nationalists.  Such a coalition would tell the electorate that Fico believes the way 
forward leads backwards.  Back to a divisive period…So, political history and 
logic suggest Fico will look to the right to form a governing coalition.61 
This argument looks very much like those made by many observers in the international 
press in the days between the election and the formation of the coalition.  A coalition 
with SNS and HZDS, especially when there were other, viable coalition options 
available, seemed to be a sign that Slovakia was headed back towards a more national, as 
opposed to supranational model.  It returned Vladimir Meciar, the HZDS leader best 
known for nearly ruining Slovakia’s chances at EU membership, to a place within the 
government, and relegitimized the SNS whose outspoken leader, Jan Slota, was notorious 
for drunken rants about Hungarians, and for complaining about the Roma birth rate.  If 
Fico was trying to recreate himself and his party not as the Euroskeptics they had been in 
the 90s, but as pro-European, forward thinking social democrats, a coalition with the two 
Slovak parties which look the least Euro-friendly seems an odd choice. 
 Supranationality
The Party of European Socialists (PES), the umbrella organization for socialist 
parties in the European Union, also thought that this was an unfitting choice.  Only weeks 
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after the formation of the coalition, they issued a suspension to Smer, charging that as 
nationalism was in direct conflict with the ideals of socialism, a coalition with an extreme 
nationalist party was inappropriate for a member of their organization. In June, there will 
be a review of this suspension, but it marks an important sight for analyzing the 
orientation of the present government.62 
Since the party’s suspension from the PES, Fico and other Smer leaders have 
made no attempt to negotiate with the PES to regain entry to the organization.  The leader 
of the PES, Martin Schultz , has expressed confusion on several occasions as to why the 
party would not try to regain their place within the organization.  He has said that he, 
“can’t imagine why Robert Fico would be so passive”63 in his approach to Smer’s 
suspension.  Indeed, it seems Fico would have very little to lose by negotiating with the 
PES, and significant international legitimacy to gain. 
 Fico’s response to suspension from the PES represents one of the ways that the 
government’s behavior since forming a coalition has indicated a dubious commitment to 
the principle of supranationality.  In a supranational organization like the European 
Union, the multi-lateral relationships formed in block groups like the PES are especially 
important.  During the Meciar government, antagonistic relations with diplomats from 
other EU countries were one issue which led to Slovakia’s international isolation.  
Additionally, membership in party groups, like the PES, are important for creating a 
voice for individual state party programs within the wider context of the European 
community.  Fico has shown, through his lack of response to PES criticism, and his 
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continued defense of the SNS as a party which is not extremist or nationalist, that he is 
not overly concerned with the maintenance of these international relationships. 
 Additionally, in Slovak foreign policy, Fico and his party have seemed to make 
moves towards asserting greater Slovak independence from European ideas.  Fico was 
recently criticized for attending a gala at the Cuban embassy in Bratislava in honor of the 
communist revolution in that country.  Domestically, this raised eyebrows as an issue of 
decorum, but it also seems to be one event of several which signal a shift in Slovakia’s 
foreign policy in general.64 
In addition to attending the party at the Cuban embassy, Fico has also 
strengthened Slovakia’s ties with a number of internationally isolated regimes like Libya 
and Belarus.  This general trend in improving Slovak relationships with this kind of 
regime represents a show of Slovak independence in issues of policy from the European 
Union.  Especially when combined with the governments somewhat tense relationship 
with it’s counterparts in Europe, this seems to be a troubling move away from European 
concepts of a supranational vision of Europe, and towards more independent policy 
making as well as closer relationships with troubling regimes.65 
Finally, the rhetoric of some of the members of the coalition, especially the SNS, 
has been in direct conflict with principles of supranational government in Europe.  Jan 
Slota has stated, in an interview with the Slovak Spectator: 
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I think the word “national” should be heard louder in European politics.  I want to 
work for my nation.  I am also a part of Europe and the European Union, but only 
as long as no one interferes with my national rights.66 
This rhetoric, which exemplifies much of the program of the SNS, is in opposition to the 
European Union’s political vision which demands the sacrifice of a level of national 
autonomy to European level governance. 
 On the whole, then, it seems unclear whether Smer and its coalition truly support 
the supranationality of the European Union.  Some members of the coalition actually 
seem to directly oppose it.  In this way, Slovak government behavior seems not to 
conform to the political vision of the EU as relates to the further development of 
European integration, despite rhetoric to the contrary. 
 Democracy
At the most basic level, Slovak democracy is functioning.  The coalition was 
democratically elected, and seems to truly reflect the wishes of the Slovak people.  There 
have, however, been some disturbing early signs in terms of the government’s 
commitment to democracy and the openness and freedom of the government.  The 
government announced recently that cabinet sessions would be closed to the public.  This 
was seen by many as an attempt to limit public access to information, and as seriously 
decreasing the transparency of the government.  There have also been other failed 
attempts to limit access to information about government proceedings for the public.  
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These measures failed largely in response to significant criticism by the international 
community and NGOs in Slovakia.67 
Additionally, the government has had tense relationships with the media from the 
very first day after the election, when according to the Slovak Spectator, “the victorious 
Smer party barred journalists from its headquarters and forced them to wait outside on the 
sidewalk” (Slovak Spectator).  Since the election, the government has further antagonized 
journalists with its policies, and has been accused of trying to direct the media’s coverage 
of important government events.  Although there has not been any direct attack on the 
freedom of the press, the government’s policies do not seem to promote the media 
freedom and access that would seem to be embodied by the EU’s concept of strong, free 
democratic societies.68 
Finally, the government has come under fire for appointing the children of 
prominent businessmen, party officials, and donors to high ranking positions within the 
government.69 Although the government has argued that all of their nominees are 
qualified, widespread accusations of corruption still abound.  These accusations were not 
lessened when, recently, the economic minister made a statement supporting the use of 
dirty money by the government in order to secure arms deals in competition with private 
companies. 
 Overall, there have been a number of signs that the government’s commitment to 
truly free and democratic institutions is questionable.  While the government backs up its 
decisions, the high level of questionable behavior indicates some underlying corruption.  
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Finally, attempts to limit access by the media to government actions make these 
behaviors increasingly suspect. 
 Human and Minority Rights
After the formation of the coalition, one of the most immediate concerns 
expressed by the international community was over the situation of minority rights.  
There was concern that the inclusion of the ultra-nationalist SNS, which had a history of 
extreme anti-minority rhetoric, combined with Robert Fico’s own history of less extreme 
rhetoric would lead to the worsening of inter-ethnic relations. While Fico’s political party 
program was primarily focused on economics, one clause specifically guarantees equal 
attention to all regardless of nationality or ethnicity70, but his choice of coalition partners 
immediately called this into question. 
 These fears seemed to be confirmed when immediately following the election and 
the formation of the coalition there was a small rash of violent incidents against 
Hungarian minorities in Southern Slovakia.  More disturbing than the events themselves, 
however, was the response of the government.  In one incident, a young Hungarian 
student claimed to have been attacked in a small town in southern Slovakia.  The 
government did not quickly condemn the attack, and in fact went on to blame Hungarians 
themselves for the situation.  Robert Fico called the claims an “attempt to damage 
Slovakia’s image”71, and the girl herself reported that “six policemen were shouting at 
[her] that [she] was a liar and that [she] had been lying from the beginning”72 Relations 
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with Hungary became significantly more tense in the immediate aftermath of the events, 
until eventually calming due to bi-lateral negotiations between the two governments. 
 Despite the official calming of tensions, these events helped cement the 
Hungarian minority political party’s (SMK) skepticism of the new coalition.  This was 
not improved by the government’s continued action towards minorities.  There was some 
early talk among government officials of repealing the minority language law, which was 
one of the central requirements for Slovak accession to the EU.   This talk seems largely 
to have stopped, however some of the official appointments made by the government 
have continued to call into question the level at which they show respect for minority 
rights and the concerns of minority groups. 
 The most high profile example of this is the appointment of Ivan Petransky to lead 
the Institute of National Memory.  The Institute of National Memory is “an archive that 
documents and publishes state crimes committed under Slovakia’s 20th century fascist 
and communist regimes”73 The director of the institute is responsible for handling and 
disseminating all of the information regarding the history, especially related to the secret 
police, from these periods. Petransky’s appointment was considered questionable because 
his previous job was as a historian for the ultra-nationalist historical and cultural society, 
Matica Slovenska.  Matica Slovenska openly glorifies the war-time fascist state and is 
well known for its paranoid anti-minority rhetoric.  According to the Slovak Spectator 
“Matica Slovenská publications do not conceal an approval of the Slovak wartime state 
and its president, Jozef Tiso, and even cast doubt on the historical event of the 
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Holocaust.”74 Given his past association, many saw this appointment as demonstrating a 
clear conflict, and accused Petransky as being unfit for the position.  His appointment 
was initially not approved after he was seen attending a rally in celebration of the war-
time fascist state.  Despite these criticisms, however, the government pushed through his 
appointment to the post.  Many historians have expressed concern that he will not 
appropriately deal with the information regarding the fascist past in Slovakia.  The 
government’s continued support of Petransky, seems to indicate a lack of interest in these 
criticisms.75 
Fico’s foreign policy has also been seen as a troubling sign of the government’s 
dubious relationship to human and minority rights.  Fico’s visit to the Cuban embassy, 
discussed in the previous section, was largely interpreted as tacit support for the 
widespread human rights violations which occur in that country.  One representative from 
a human rights NGO in Slovakia argued that Fico’s attendance at this event represented a 
celebration by Fico of a regime that “for 48 years has been putting free-thinking people in 
jail and keeping the rest isolated on the island without giving them the change to freely 
choose their political representation.”76 Such concerns were hardly allayed when the 
Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, Dusan Caplovic, defended Fico’s presence at 
the event, further asserting that Fidel Castro was not a dictator and seeming to downplay 
the human rights abuses occurring in that country.77 
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Thus, while the government as a whole does not have an officially anti-minority 
orientation, its behavior calls into question its dedication to the full protection of the 
minority communities in Slovakia.  Additionally, some of its appointees, as well as the 
leaders of some of the parties in government, express an openly disdainful attitude 
towards minorities and exhibit strong nationalist tendencies.  Finally, Fico’s behavior 
towards Cuba, and the statements of some of his ministers have seemed to express a 
contradiction between commonly held European conceptions of human rights and the 
understanding of these rights in the Slovak government. 
 Social Responsibility
It is in the area of social responsibility that Smer’s rhetoric seems most clearly to 
conform to the ideas of the European Union.  As a socialist party, many of the theories 
underlying Smer’s political program are based on greater social welfare and protection.  
Unfortunately, the paths that he has taken in these areas do not conform as well in 
practice as in theory to the European social model.  His focus here has been taxation and 
monetary policy.  Despite the fact that his economic ideas may be somewhat more leftist, 
they do not seem to create a clear improvement in the economic and social conditions of 
the country.  Additionally, many of the policies which Fico would like to see overturned, 
such as tax and financial policy, represent some of the most successful policies of the last 
government and are viewed quite favorably in the international community.  Finally, 
because Fico’s vision of social responsibility does not seem, in practice, to extend to 
minorities (as discussed above), it is difficult to take his claims of improving the 
conditions of all those in Slovakia seriously. 
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Chapter 8
Slovak Public Opinion and the European Union 
 The final level of analysis at which I will examine Slovakia’s political culture in 
relation to the political vision of the European Union is through public opinion.  Using 
both domestic public opinion polls, and data from the 2006 Eurobarometer, I will look at 
Slovak support for the government as well as the EU.  Additionally, I will explore Slovak 
opinion of these bodies, the way they should function, and the impact that they have on 
their lives as citizens. 
 Government vs. EU Support
As I have discussed in previous sections, in the June elections, Smer received just 
under 30% of the vote.  The other two coalition partners, the HZDS and the SNS, 
received 8.79% and 11.73% of the vote respectively.78 Given some of the contentious 
decisions made by the government in recent months (discussed in previous chapters), it is 
interesting to see how stable the government’s support has been since its election. 
 A recent public opinion poll conducted by the Statistics Office’s Institute for 
Public Opinion Research (UVVM) in February 200779 shows that not only is Smer still 
the most popular party in the country, but its support has actually increased significantly 
since the party took office.  According to this survey, 46.7% of respondents support 
Smer, a truly incredible number in Slovakia’s multi-party system.  Additionally, the SNS, 
while having lost some support since the election (down to 10.6% from 11.73% of votes 
in the election), is now the second most popular party in the country due to plummeting 
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levels of support for the former government party of the SDKU.  The HZDS has also 
done well, with its support rising to 10.4%.  The combined support for the three parties in 
the government is 67.7%  
 This high level of support is particularly interesting in light of the government’s 
criticism by the international community in a number of areas.  Smer’s support, of 
course, is the most astounding.  An opinion in the Slovak Spectator recently speculated 
that in the next round of elections, Fico’s Smer would have the ability to rule as a single 
party, without a coalition80. While this may still be some ways off, it is clear that Smer 
holds significant power among the Slovak public, and that the coalition in general enjoys 
extremely high levels of support. 
 The European Union also continues to enjoy extremely high levels of public 
support in Slovakia.  In the recent Eurobarometer survey81, conducted in the fall of 2006, 
after the parliamentary elections, 61% of Slovaks considered EU membership a good 
thing.  An even higher percentage, 71%, believed that the country had benefited from EU 
membership.  These numbers are interesting in relation to one another, because the 
government seems to garner similarly high levels of support to those of the European 
Union, despite the fact that as I have discussed in previous sections, their values do not 
always seem to align. 
 A similar contradiction seems to arise over questions of trust.  Slovaks, as they 
have done in the past, trust the European Union significantly more than they trust their 
own national government.  Only 39% of Slovaks trust the Slovak government (although 
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Fico’s individual numbers are higher at 45.6%) while 62% trust the European Union.  On 
the other hand, government trust has increased by 18% since the election of the new 
coalition.  These numbers seem likely to continue to increase given the high levels of 
government support throughout Slovakia.  Concurrently, trust for the European Union 
has also increased.  Thus, while Slovaks have generally tended to trust EU institutions 
more readily than national institutions, and continue to do so, it is interesting to observe 
that both of these numbers have gone up, despite government behavior.  The government, 
which seems to act in opposition to many core EU values, is more trusted than the 
previous government which was widely viewed in a positive light by the EU.  
Additionally, trust in such a government has not had any negative impact on growing 
trust in EU institutions. 
 European Integration and Stronger European Political Union
One of the questions asked on the most recent Eurobarometer related to support or 
lack of support for “the development of European integration towards European political 
union”.  At the most basic level, this question is key in evaluating EU citizen support for 
increased supranationality in the European Union, and thus speaks to one of the core 
political values of the EU.  Answers to this question would seem to be a marker of 
whether or not individuals support this concept. 
 Slovaks, along with Slovenes, came out as the most supportive of the 25 states 
surveyed of such developments.  77% of Slovaks supported the above quote, and 
therefore, at least in theory, the principle of supranational governance and an expanded 
European influence on political community.  Interestingly, however, the Eurobarometer 
goes on to observe that while Slovaks support the concept of greater European political 
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unity, their views on what this entails “do not correspond with the probable competencies 
of European political union”.  In other words, Slovak definitions of a political union do 
not correspond with EU hopes for such a union. 
 In discussing the areas where the EU should have influence over Slovak policy, 
58% of Slovaks believe that agriculture should be the sole responsibility of the national 
government, while even more, 80%, believe that the EU should not play a role in the 
development of taxation policy.  Ironically, the European Union already has an 
extraordinarily high degree of control over the development of agricultural policies 
through the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).  While the EU does not directly control 
tax policy, it does influence economic policy, and many of the tax policies passed by the 
previous government were related to European demands of economic integration.  Thus, 
the areas where Slovaks believe the EU should have the least influence actually represent 
areas where the EU has a relatively significant influence. 
 On the other hand, Slovaks are generally quite comfortable with a large degree of 
EU influence on foreign and security policy.  These are policy areas towards which the 
EU leaders might like to expand, but where it has little concrete control at the present 
time.  In general, it is in the realm of domestic policies such as agriculture, food 
production, human and minority rights, and monetary issues where the EU has the most 
significant influence.  At this time, European states have been generally reluctant to 
sacrifice national sovereignty on foreign and security issues. 
 Thus, European political community actually functions in direct opposition to 
Slovak concepts of how this community should be structured.  The policies which 
Slovaks feel least inclined to sacrifice to supranational governance are the policies over 
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which the EU has the most concrete control, and those policies where Slovaks are more 
willing to give up their national sovereignty are areas where the EU has, and is likely to 
continue at least for a few years to have, relatively little control.  This points to a 
contradiction between EU and Slovak concepts of increased political union, which make 
the interpretation of strong Slovak support for such a union extremely complicated. 
 Slovak Vision of the European Union
Finally, in evaluating public opinion in Slovakia, it is important to look at how 
Slovaks view and define the European Union.  I have already established that Slovaks 
show strong support for the European Union in general, and for the concepts of further 
political integration within the Union.  On the other hand, there have seemed to be some 
contradictions in Slovak and EU interpretations of these concepts.  How, then, do Slovaks 
perceive the European Union as an institutional body? 
 When asked to describe the values that most represent the European Union, the 
most common answer among Slovaks was democracy, which 50% of Slovaks identified 
as the principle which most defined the European Union.  After democracy were peace 
and human rights, each of which were chosen by 43% of respondents.  Additionally, 72% 
of Slovaks believe that the values of European states are “fairly close” or “very close” to 
one another.  In their definition of the European Union, Slovaks are similar to other 
European states in choosing issues of democracy, peace and human rights.  These 
answers also seem to conform to the EU’s own political project and core values. 
 Somewhat contradictory, however, are Slovaks’ perceptions of their role within 
this institution.  Despite rating democracy as the most central value of the European 
Union, 62% of Slovaks “do not think their voice counts in the European Union”, and only 
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10% of Slovaks feel that they are “involved with the European Union”.  Also, while 
Slovaks rate human rights as a strong value of the European Union, there was significant 
outcry among both the public and several political parties against passing minority 
protection legislation as mandated by the European Union during the accession process.82 
Thus, Slovaks believe that democracy defines the European Union as an 
institution, but do not feel that they, as citizens within this democracy, have a voice.  
They believe that human rights are central to the European Union, and that European 
values tend to be consistent across states, but do not support the sorts of legislation that 
the EU deems necessary for the protection of these rights which are so central.  These 
contradictions seem to point to a complexity of interaction between the European Union 
and Slovakia which will be analyzed in more depth in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 9
Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the relationship between Slovak visions of their own 
place in Europe and their domestic political community, of Europe’s political future, and 
of the European Union’s own political vision and expectations.  Using public opinion 
data, voting patterns and government policy and behavior I have examined the Slovak 
political orientation both domestically and in relation to the EU.  I have offered a broad 
focus which includes both individual’s and the government’s perspectives, and to 
examine not only individual factors, but the interaction of a variety of variables. Through 
this exploration, I have attempted to answer the question of whether Slovakia conforms to 
the European Union’s core political vision.  
My exploration suggests that there is not a clear yes or no answer to this question.  
Slovakia’s relationship with the political goals of the European Union seems to be 
complicated and contradictory.  At times, Slovaks seem to embody the ideal European 
citizens, with high levels of support for the European Union and for further integration of 
the European community.  On the other hand, there seems to be relatively low levels of 
support for the sorts of policies which would back up these positive indicators.  Referring 
back to my earlier critique of existing scholarship on Europeanization, we can see that it 
is precisely these complexities which are largely absent in examinations of 
Europeanization and European integration. 
 In chapter two, I argued that the existing literature tends to neglect the bi-
directional nature of Europeanization.  While Borzel has addressed this to some extent in 
her scholarship, I believe that her primary focus on institutional development excludes an 
important aspect of these processes: the interaction between not only EU institutions and 
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domestic institutions, but between the underlying understandings of political culture in 
the European Union and individual states.  I argued that in examining and evaluating 
processes of Europeanization, it is important to look both at shifts in policy and at 
changes which happen at the level of political culture, and simultaneously examine not 
only how the EU interacts with member states, but also how member states respond to the 
EU.  The contradictions inherent in the Slovak case point to the fact that to ignore these 
issues is to ignore some of the more serious, underlying challenges of Europeanization. 
 An examination of the Slovak case from a purely institutional perspective would 
likely result in a rather positive conclusion about Slovakia’s progress towards 
Europeanization.  A deeper look at the functioning of these institutions might be slightly 
less optimistic, but would tend to also indicate strong progress.  Slovakia has made legal 
reforms and shifted many of its policies to conform to the norms required by the 
European Union, and at least rhetorically, the government perceives itself as moving 
towards Europe. 
 Concurrently, examining the Slovak case from the perspective of only cultural 
and social developments, as measured primarily by opinion polls, would also likely lead 
to a positive conclusion.  Public support for Slovakia’s continued integration into the 
European Union is high, and Slovaks have high levels of trust and support for the EU.  
Slovaks rank higher than almost any other state in the Union in all of these areas. 
 As I have examined in this paper, however, these findings do not tell the whole 
story.  Thus, an examination of the process of Europeanization in Slovakia which takes 
into account only one side of the process is likely to have somewhat superficial results.  It 
is only when we dig deeper, and begin to examine the interactions between the varying 
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aspects of this process that we find the contradictions which I have explored in this thesis.  
These contradictions only become evident in the interplay between EU and domestic 
political cultures, and in the relationships between citizens and governments, which tend 
not to be concretely addressed in literature on Europeanization. 
 It is in these interactions that we can observe that although Slovaks have high 
levels of support for the European Union, their voting behaviors and their understanding 
of the European Union make the meaning behind this support difficult to gauge.  
Although Slovaks support greater European integration, they also do not believe that this 
should infringe on control over domestic issues, which contradicts the European Union’s 
own goals of greater supranational governance.  Slovaks believe that the European Union 
represents their values, but do not believe that they have a say in the organization which 
dictates how those values will be represented.  All of this points to an underlying conflict 
which is not clear through an examination based on individual factors alone. 
 It is in these contradictions between the domestic political culture of Slovakia and 
the European Union’s political ideals that we see the impact of nationalism on 
Europeanization in the Slovak case.  There is still a strong undercurrent of nationalist 
sentiment among both individuals and the government in Slovakia.  In relation to 
Europeanization, nationalism is likely to always present a conflict.  From the earliest days 
of the European Coal and Steel Community, it was nationalism which was European 
unity’s greatest foe.  It is difficult to conceive of a state which can be simultaneously 
committed to nationalism and supranationalism.  The terms seem to contradict one 
another, and yet this seems to underlie Slovakia’s current political situation. 
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Slovakia has a government which contains parties with a strong history of 
nationalist sentiment.  Current sentiment is less extreme, but has tended to be 
increasingly nationalist in recent years, and yet as this nationalist rhetoric increases, so 
does Slovakia’s claims to and support for European integration.  This conflict between a 
domestic political culture which still has strong nationalist undertones and an EU political 
culture dedicated to eliminating such sentiments may also help to explain many of the 
contradictions in public opinion, for example high support for the European Union 
combined with an aversion to EU intervention in domestic affairs, or pro-EU rhetoric by 
government parties combined with simultaneous assertions of political independence 
through policy.    The EU is viewed positively, but conflicting concepts of political 
culture mean that implementation of policies is challenging, and the political parties 
which Slovaks support may not be the most pro-EU.  Eventually, this conflict will have 
to be negotiated.  In the long run, Slovakia and the EU are dealing with a contradiction of 
values at a deep level, and if Europeanization is going to continue, this contradiction will 
have to be resolved.   
 Europeanization, however, progresses without attention to the intricacies and 
contradictions present in individual states.  Instead, EU accession, meant to be the 
institutional embodiment of this process, is applied as a cookie cutter formula to all 
states, with the expectations that all states will comply in identical ways.  By ignoring 
individual situations, the EU has created long term challenges for itself in the attempt to 
develop a strongly united European community. 
 I predict that the long-term impacts of these contradictions will have serious 
implications for the EU’s goal of European unification.  If the political goals of states 
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continue to conflict, at a basic level, with the political goals of the European Union, 
support for the EU both among citizens and among governments is likely to falter.  This 
is likely to mean a lack of political will and societal support for the continued integration 
of states into the European community, and for the expansion of supranational 
governance in Europe. 
 These explorations, however, still leave open the question of why these 
contradictions and challenges exist. I touched on this briefly in the preceding paragraphs, 
but they warrant greater theorizing.  Based on my research, I believe that there are 
multiple influences which have shaped the Slovak case.  Some of these are specific to the 
Slovakia in particular, but others seem to point to a larger European trend and to 
underlying challenges in the European Union and processes of Europeanization. 
 Slovak history, as explored in Chapter 3, is marked by almost contiguous 
domination by outside forces.  In the context of both empires and federal states, Slovak 
national identity has been challenged and threatened for as long as it has existed.  
Nationalist sentiment, in both the positive and negative sense, developed among Slovaks 
as a reaction to such threats.  Historically, when Slovaks have felt that their identity was 
threatened, nationalist sentiment, particularly outspoken and violent nationalist sentiment, 
has tended to rise in response to an insecurity of identity, and a desire to protect 
individual national identity.  One example of this is the rise of fascism partially in 
response to the sense of domination by the Czech majority in Czechoslovakia.  This is 
perhaps the most extreme case, but  there are other examples of the relationship between 
domination or autonomy and nationalism, such as the rise of nationalism in response to 
Magyarization, and decreases in nationalism under communism after the Czechoslovak 
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state was federalized and Slovakia granted significant autonomy within the state.  These 
examples show a link between a sense of threat to the Slovak identity and the rise of 
nationalist and oppositional sentiment within Slovakia. 
 We can see a similar situation now in response to the European Union.  The 
current Slovak state is the first fully independent, autonomous state in Slovak history.  It 
is the first time that Slovaks have been fully in control of their own affairs, but the EU 
has limited that.  Immediately after independence, Slovakia moved to join the EU and 
thus has once again placed its sovereignty partially in the hands of another entity.  While 
the EU may not be a dominating force in the same way as, for example, Austria-Hungary, 
it represents the transfer of control over Slovak affairs away from Slovaks and towards a 
supranational entity.  This actual transfer, combined with a cultural memory of much 
stronger domination, then invokes a rise in nationalist sentiment in order to more strongly 
assert the Slovak identity. 
 Partially, this is due to the interactions between Slovakia and the European Union 
in the process of accession, and in the implementation of policies since membership.  In 
discussing theories of nationalism early in the paper, I outlined three major approaches to 
the study.  I myself defined nationalism using an ethnosymbolist approach, but it is 
interesting to look at the modernist and primordialist approaches in examining Slovak 
interactions with the EU. 
 Slovak nationalism has typically taken a primordialist approach to understanding 
the nation.  That is, Slovak national consciousness is described as being deeply linked to 
a historical and almost spiritual connection to “Slovakness”.  In contrast, the European 
Union takes a much more modernist approach to understanding national identity.  That is, 
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the EU treats national identity as something which can be shaped, and changed over time, 
and uses integration and accession to attempt to create new identities for its citizens.  The 
EU, then, assumes that individuals within states will respond to this project in rational 
ways and with modernist concepts of their own identities.  In Slovakia, however, because 
national identity is grounded in rhetoric of primordial, historical attachment, this 
modernist project of constructing new identities, and of identifying oneself strongly with 
a supranational identity, becomes an attack on the foundations of national identity.  The 
EU and Slovakia are approaching the idea of identity in concretely different ways, and 
this leads to a lack of fit between the EU’s approach and the Slovak approach.  In a sense, 
the two groups are speaking different languages of the nation, and this is a major factor in 
creating opposing political cultures which subsequently create challenges to 
Europeanization. 
 Although these proceses do seem to be linked to the particularities of Slovak 
history, if we look more broadly at Europe in general, many of the contradictions and 
problems which I have examined in the Slovak case seem not to be isolated, but to fit into 
a larger trend.  Throughout Europe from France to Finland, not to mention in the rest of 
Central and Eastern Europe, there is growing support for nationalist policies and growing 
opposition to the further expansion of EU control.  We can see these trends in the 
German parliamentary elections of 2006 where in several regional parliaments neo-Nazi 
parties gained seats, in the current French elections, and, of course, in the failure of the 
EU constitution which was perceived by many as an attempt to bring greater 
federalization to the European system. 
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It would seem that the contradictions which I have explored in this thesis, 
although influenced by Slovakia’s own history and current situation, run deeper than 
simply the particularities of individual, national cases, and instead can be seen throughout 
the EU.  Negative reactions to greater supranationalism have become a European trend.  I 
theorize that given this wider trend, many of the challenges we see in Slovakia actually 
rest in the process of Europeanization and the project of EU expansion itself.  As these 
processes continue, national sovereignty is increasingly eroded, and this makes states and 
their citizens increasingly insecure.  The response has been stronger support for 
nationalism and Euroskeptic policies.  These policies are appealing in response to the EU 
because they address the underlying fear of loss of identitiy which grows as the 
independence of states is gradually lost.  It make sense that the earliest signs of such 
trends are most apparent in young states which are already insecure, like Slovakia, but 
they are increasingly evident in strong, established democracies as well. 
 These conflicts, if left unchecked, will have serious long-term consequences for 
the European Union.  Indeed, it seems possible that such conflicts could spell its end.  
The sort of supranational governance that the EU would like to promote requires strong 
support from both individual states and from individuals in order to succeed.  There must 
be strong political will backing sacrifices in national sovereignty, or such sacrifices will 
not be accepted.  Citizens must view the positive impacts of such policies as outweighing 
the loss they cause in order to find them appealing, and the current situation would seem 
to indicate that support for such views is not clear.  Perhaps the European Union has 
simply reached the boundaries of supranationality in Europe and can go no further, either 
physically or politically. 
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If the EU continues to try to extend its reach in spite of the growing negative 
impacts of such policies, it is likely that these early signs of national backlash will grow 
into much more serious opposition, and that this opposition will continue to spread.  It is 
perhaps time for the European Union to reevaluate its goals and reconsider the final 
outcome that it would like to achieve.  It is certain that the EU’s current project still has a 
long way to go.  If the EU wants to continue on its current path, it will need to try to 
resolve the contradictions present in the Slovak case, and increasingly in other European 
states as well.  Whether or not these contradictions are resolvable or simply represent the 
final borders of Supranationalism today is something which will only become clear in the 
years to come. 
 The European Union’s future success or failure seems to me to depend on its 
ability to find a balance between EU and member state goals, and between supranational 
control and national sovereignty.  It may be that stronger supranational governance is not 
reasonable for Europe today, but the EU still has the opportunity to be an organization 
which creates greater security and stronger democracies through the cooperation of states.  
The future of the EU as an institution, of the values that it embodies, and of the structure 
of the European community is dependent upon the negotiation of the complex and often 
contradictory relationships between member states and the European Union. 
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